Emigration: A Western Balkan Tragedy
Introduction
The six Western Balkan countries come from similar authoritarian and communist or socialist experiences. After the violent conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the fall of the Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha, the 1990s represented years of democratic and economic transitions in a context of general instability. The weak economies, wide inequalities, social exclusion, and state capture that emerged as a result of turbulent political and economic transitions became drivers for the depopulation of the Western Balkan countries due to out-migration.
All six Western Balkan countries have since then started an emigration trend which keeps threatening their demographic data. While more young people leave their countries searching for better opportunities, the economic growth of the region remains stagnant and dependent on diaspora remittances.
This article will start by presenting data on out-migration from the six Western Balkan countries, later outlining the main causes and consequences of emigration, followed by a focus on each country’s recent policies intended to incentivise the return of their emigrants.
Data from the Region
According to recent estimates, all the countries of the region have suffered from a serious loss of population during the past decades.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s data are the most concerning, with possibly more than 40% of its population living abroad, a number that has not ceased to increase through the years (Wankiewicz-Kłoczko, 2025). Albania follows this trend, with around 30-40% of its population living abroad, a number 6 times higher than in 1990 (Wankiewicz-Kłoczko, 2025). Between 25 and 38% of North Macedonia’s citizens have left the country (Zulfiu Alili, 2025). Although accurate data regarding Kosovo are difficult to retrieve, it is estimated that about 22% of Kosovo’s population lives abroad (OECD, 2022). Montenegro’s data about emigration remained overall stable through the years, with about 24% of its population residing in third countries (Golubović, 2021). Lastly, although the lowest in the region, Serbia’s emigration is also increasing, with 15% of Serbian citizens abroad (Wankiewicz-Kłoczko, 2025).
Why do they leave?
Since the fall of the former regimes in Albania and the former Yugoslavia, the new independent countries have gone through a quick political and economic transition, characterised by widespread corruption, state capture, receding economies and growing inequalities. The unreliable systems fomented a general lack of trust in state institutions.
Beyond the border, the growing economies of Western European countries, the perceived reliability of their public institutions and labour markets, and their offer of opportunities, represent attractive features, able to promise a better life.
Migration trends can be explained through the logic of push and pull factors. Push factors represent the reasons that incentivise people to leave their countries, identified in events such as violent conflicts, discrimination, or poor economic conditions. Pull factors operate on the other side, constituting those elements that attract migrants towards a particular country of arrival, such as better job opportunities and living conditions.
In general, the main push factors for citizens of the Western Balkans include the vast wage gap between the WB economies and EU countries, with EU wages registering consistently higher rates than WB wages; Low employment opportunities and labour market inefficiencies in the WB, primarily focused on unskilled labour; And the higher returns on human capital in EU countries, where they tend to emigrate, meaning the benefits an individual gains from investments in education, such as better job satisfaction, financial growth, and improved social mobility (Mara & Landesmann, 2022).
Migration is considered a symptom of wage and employment disparities, and wage gaps are addressed as factors that impact migration patterns. The wage gap and the migration rates are directly proportional and linked to a maximisation of income: The larger the wage differences between EU (higher wages) and WB (lower salaries) countries, the stronger the migration flows from Western Balkan countries to EU Member States. However, due to an increasing number of skilled workers leaving the country, such migration further widens the wage gaps in the country of origin. This happens as a consequence of a domestic labour market suffering from a shortage of highly skilled workers and reduced productivity and economic growth, resulting in further difficulties in wage raises (OECD, 2025).
A more significant education gap between the WB and the EU also increases migration from the WB towards the EU. Unfortunately, many Western Balkan universities still suffer from a lack of funding, limited programme quality, and uneven recognition in the EU market (Jansen et al., 2024). For Western Balkan students, pursuing a degree in an EU country translates into higher possibilities for entering job positions in the EU market, as the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) ensures standardisation and recognition of degrees throughout EU Member States (EHEA, 2024).
What Remains for the Countries of Origin
The constant and consistent emigration from the Western Balkans is inevitably affecting the countries of origin, particularly causing labour shortages, demographic decline, brain drain, and economic, social, and political impacts.
The outflow of workers has left serious shortages across various sectors, directly hindering economic development and limiting investments (Ghodsi et al., 2024). Shortages in highly skilled sectors in the region are putting pressure on the healthcare and education systems, but agriculture, forestry, fishery, and crafts are also suffering from the emigration of non-qualified workers, with over 10% deficits (Bélorgey et al., 2012). While remittances provide household income and represent 10% of the WB6 combined GDP (OECD, 2022), overall, consumption is widely reduced, the tax base is smaller, and GDP growth remains limited.
Wage and education gaps, meaning the difference in wage and education opportunities between arrival countries and countries of origin, are major push factors for the mass migration of skilled individuals, leading to increased rates of what is defined as “brain drain”: a lack of qualified individuals such as doctors, engineers, and specialists of various sectors in the countries of origin’s labour market.
Combined with a low birth rate, continued emigration has caused a significant demographic crisis, characterised by population ageing and shrinking. The working-age population in the region dropped of 6% only during the 2012-2020 period. This means that a smaller and older working population must support a larger ageing population, putting social systems and healthcare under further pressure (Esch et al., 2020).
Some studies suggest that emigration often acts as a safety valve for high unemployment: Because a large number of people emigrate, the official unemployment rate of their countries of origin results in being lower than it would be if citizens did not emigrate. High emigration also seems to reduce pressure for political reform: It has been observed that those mostly disappointed with the current regimes and seeking political change often leave their countries, looking for political alignment with their views somewhere else.
Overall, high emigration rates are both a symptom and a cause of a struggling economy in the countries of origin, highlighting the growing need for addressing systemic and deeply rooted unemployment issues.
Recent Policies for Incentivising Return Migration
Facing a situation of demographic crisis, brain drain, and stress on various labour sectors, all six Western Balkan countries have put in place policies meant to attract the return of their citizens abroad.
In recent years, the Albanian government has implemented various policies and programmes targeting the Albanian diaspora. The National Diaspora Strategy was meant to promote return migration, skills transfer, and diaspora entrepreneurship in Albania, as well as formalising ties with the diaspora. The Strategy also created a State Ministry for Diaspora to address the emigration issue and maintain contact and cooperation with the Albanian communities abroad, through cultural, educational, and scientific programmes (Council of Ministers - Republic of Albania, 2020). Under the “Brain Gain” Programme, the government promised financial incentives for highly skilled Albanians to return to their home country, also through tax incentives and business facilitation for diaspora investors (Western Balkans Info Hub, 2023).
Key policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to incentivise return migration have been the 2020-2024 Diaspora Strategy and Policy on Cooperation with Diaspora, which encouraged investments, knowledge transfer, and temporary return (Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017).
Kosovo has implemented the Strategy on Migration 2021-2025, offering incentives for business and simplifying investment through legal, social, and political rights (STRATEGY on MIGRATION 2021-2025, n.d.). Other programs, such as the Diaspora Investment Window, provide financial support for diaspora businesses and start-ups development (Kosovo Credit Guarantee Fund, 2025).
Montenegro has established a Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and implements various policies to incentivise the return of its emigrants. The 2020-2023 Diaspora Cooperation Strategy focused on strengthening ties, enhancing economic partnerships, and preserving the cultural identity of the Montenegrins abroad (Skupština Crne Gore, n.d.).
North Macedonia has targeted its diaspora through the National Strategy 2019-2023, now renewed until 2030, which focuses on strengthening ties and facilitating economic investment and administrative support for its citizens abroad (Nikolik, 2025). The development of “Brain Gain” and skills return programs also aimed at attracting high-skilled Macedonians to come back to their homeland (Center for Research and Policy Making, 2012).
Serbia owns the most developed return framework in the region, with policies such as the 2021-2027 Strategy on Economic Migration, with the explicit goal to reverse brain drain by improving the living and working conditions in the country and strengthening ties with its diaspora, also seeking to retain the working-age population through economic development (Aleksić Mirić, 2022). The “Returning Point” platform seeks to support circular migration, helping diaspora members to relocate to Serbia, supporting their careers and residency in the country (Returning Point, 2024). Tax reliefs for returning professionals are also available, facilitating the employment of returnees (HLB TM, 2024).
While all six countries have implemented policies to facilitate the return of their diasporas, these policies are not fully effective, showing weak implementation and suffering from limited funding, bureaucratic barriers, fragmented governance, labour market mismatch, salary gap with the countries of arrival, and an overall deficit in political trust.
Conclusion
Emigration has been a persistent issue for all six Western Balkan countries. Remittances from the diaspora represent an important share of the region’s GDP, supporting families and communities. However, while more citizens look for better opportunities in third countries, their homelands are increasingly suffering from depopulation and demographic crisis, affecting fundamental sectors such as healthcare due to a lack of specialised workers.
Migration trends are explained through push and pull factors. In the case of the Western Balkans, push factors are mostly represented by the fragile political and economic systems, little education and career opportunities, and low salaries. Pull factors are constituted by the better opportunities and living conditions in the countries of arrival.
The continued emigration is deeply affecting the countries of origin, causing labour shortages, demographic decline, and brain drain. These consequences are further weakening the societal construct and have stirred the implementation of policies aiming at reversing the migration flow, addressing the diaspora with incentives to relocate to their countries of origin.
According to OECD, return rates remain below 5% annually, highlighting persistent issues such as low wages, widespread corruption and weak Rule of Law, and limited career prospects. In addition, the return programs implemented in all six countries often lack full implementation and target short-term or symbolic returns, not permanent relocation.
Slowing down the emigration and possibly reversing it is increasingly becoming a survival issue for the countries of the region, their politics, economy, and society, highlighting the need for more comprehensive policies that can guarantee the development of the job market, an improvement of the education system, and long-term and reliable incentives for both the local population and returnees.
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