Montenegro, the Port of Bar, and a Highway to Nowhere?

Introduction

The small country of Montenegro, home to 600.000 inhabitants, gained its independence only 20 years ago, in 2006, marking the complete dissolution of Yugoslavia. Covering only about 13,800 km², the country has borders with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and Albania, as well as enjoying a beautiful Adriatic coast. Spreading from the northern town of Herceg Novi to the southern Ulcinj, Montenegro’s coastline offers a diverse range of landscapes comprising fjords, mountains, and sandy beaches.

Ça va sans dire, the 293 km long coast represents an important resource for the blue economy, including maritime transport, tourism, fisheries, and emerging offshore energy possibilities. The potential for growth in regional logistics has recently put the spotlight on maritime transport and infrastructure developments, which primarily rely on the ports of Bar and Kotor.

The port of Bar anchors Montenegro’s “Adriatic Transport Corridor”, connecting maritime routes from Italy, Greece, and Türkiye with inland overland corridors stretching toward Central and Eastern Europe (Lazarevic, 2025c). It is referred to as the only multimodal hub in Montenegro, combining sea, rail, and road transport, which makes it crucial to the country’s transport system (Interreg IPA CBC, 2022).

In recent years, the port of Bar has been subject to important infrastructure development projects that aim to improve the connections between the port and inland regions through new highways. Despite their serious value in terms of potential economic growth, these projects do not come without risks, especially under the lens of environmental and economic sustainability.

This article outlines the latest infrastructure ambitions surrounding the Port of Bar, the geopolitical interests that serve as push factors for such developments, the primary economic and environmental challenges, and the possible consequences for the future in the event of excessive foreign investment and a lack of compliance with sustainability standards.

History and Present Infrastructure Ambitions

As Montenegro’s main seaport, the Port of Bar was inaugurated in 1906, but its development accelerated only in the ‘60s, turning it into an international port with border crossings and a connection to Belgrade. Its strategic location is characterised by a natural deep basin, guaranteeing an unobstructed approach and ensuring its status among the most efficient Adriatic ports.

After multiple waves of development and restoration, necessary after WWI torpedoing and later earthquakes, throughout the past century, the port became a joint-stock company in 1998, and its restructuring was finalised in 2009. In 1974, the Belgrade-Bar railway link was also completed, guaranteeing a direct connection between the two cities, meant to facilitate transport from the Montenegrin port to the Yugoslav capital (Government of Montenegro, n.d.).

Today, the port of Bar is once again undergoing significant restructures, also aiming to better connect it with the rest of the region and Central Europe.

The ongoing 160 km Bar-Boljare Highway project aims to connect Bar, on the Adriatic coast, with Serbia and, potentially, Central Europe, making the town a logistics gateway far beyond Montenegro’s borders. As the biggest investment in Montenegro’s history, this three-phase project, together with tourist sector private investments, is considered to have had a major impact on the country’s 2015-2019 4% economic growth (World Bank, 2021).

The whole project relies on heavy foreign investments and is partly carried out by foreign companies. The first 41km section of the highway, from Smokovac to Mateševo, comprising tunnels and bridges, has been built by China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and financed by China Exim Bank. It was completed and opened in 2022 (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Union are the main co-financers of the remaining stretch, with the project supervised by the Montenegrin state-owned company Monteput, which manages tenders and contractors (EBRD, 2025).

Port-side authorities in Montenegro themselves call the Port of Bar the “key economic progress”, linking planned investments in road, rail and port infrastructure as the foundation of development (Pešić, 2025).

What’s Never Missing: Geopolitical Interests…

The infrastructural development projects that connect the port of Bar to the mainland sparked interest in foreign powers seeking business opportunities in the region. As of late 2025, Montenegro’s government was actively seeking foreign investment to develop the Port of Bar and the remaining highway stretch, speaking publicly about its potential as a “natural gateway to Europe” for regional and global trade (Lazarevic, 2025b).

For China, Bar represents a strategic entry point into Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a worldwide cooperation and economic strategy, also addressed as the “New Silk Road”, which aims to promote connectivity and create favourable trade routes (Support4Partneship, 2024). Therefore, the highway-port connection would represent a corridor for Chinese goods into European markets, bypassing and reducing dependence on traditional EU and Western European maritime hubs, such as Rotterdam and Hamburg (BIRN, 2020). The contract procedures of the BRI also contribute to the economic advantages that favour China: the infrastructure projects are carried out by Chinese companies, paid through loans by Chinese banks, and, in the case of failed loan repayment, these contracts often include very profitable clauses for the constructing company. Chinese enterprises have been increasingly present in infrastructure projects in the Western Balkans, strengthening China’s diplomatic relations with the region’s countries and its influence on their domestic and foreign policies.

Russia’s historical economic presence in Montenegro, especially in the fields of real estate, tourism, and energy, generates a natural interest in the port of Bar. As long as Montenegro is not an EU Member State, the port allows Russia to have access to the Adriatic outside EU control, which could potentially work as a logistics and energy transit hub (Montenegro Business, 2023). Nonetheless, Montenegro’s NATO membership and its fast EU alignment have drastically reduced Russia’s leverage in the country, which is increasingly limited to historical and symbolic ties, rather than operational.

The European Union and its Member States also hold geopolitical interests in the development of the port and its connectivity. Bar is currently part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) extensions into the Western Balkans, and its operation has proven essential for EU enlargement, regional integration, and supply-chain resilience. Connectivity between Bar, Belgrade, and Budapest strengthens EU-WB economic ties, guaranteeing a functional transport line and trade routes (Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, 2025). Through high investments under funding initiatives and tools such as grants (WBIF), the EIB and EBRD, the EU wants to prevent strategic infrastructure from falling under exclusive Chinese control and firmly anchor Montenegro in the EU regulatory, financial, and geopolitical orbit.

Among the EU Member States, Italy cares the most about the port’s operability. Geographically, Bar lies directly across the Italian Adriatic coast, making it a natural partner port. Recent upgrades to connectivity have been implemented, such as a new ferry line between Bar and Ancona, improving maritime links across the Adriatic (Lazarevic, 2025a). Due to this partner relation, Italian companies have historically been present and active in Montenegro’s port, energy, and infrastructure sectors (Italian Trade Agency, 2024). To fulfil the interests of short-sea shipping, Adriatic trade, and energy interconnections, the port of Bar represents for Italy a strengthened Adriatic economic space (Visco, 2021).

In summary, the port of Bar is a geopolitical checkpoint, and whoever shapes its development and connections can influence trade routes, political alignment, and strategic autonomy in the Western Balkans.

… and Challenges

The development of the port of Bar and its connectivity does not come without risks and challenges, namely regarding economic viability, environmental sustainability, and foreign interferences.

The first phase of the highway alone costs about USD 944 million, a huge burden for Montenegro’s economy. The large loans, especially those through the Chinese Exim-Bank financing for the Bar-Boljare highway section, have drastically increased Montenegro’s fiscal vulnerability and public debt, momentarily reaching around 90-100% (World Bank, 2021). Meanwhile, it is not certain whether the planned infrastructural developments will repay their costs: the port and its connectivity (if functional) have latent capacity but need commercial strategies to attract year-round traffic that could guarantee the profitability of such developments (Reuters, 2024). Currently, the traffic remains mostly seasonal through cruising and tourism-related movements, concentrating revenue at the cost of infrastructure strain and overtourism risks, without steady flows.

Despite their economic and debt-related risks, Chinese BRI contracts are often seen as profitable by local governments, especially in countries with weak rule of law standards and pervasive corruption issues: these contracts are regularly signed behind closed doors, bypassing procurement regulations. Weak procurement or politicised decision-making further increases transaction costs, deterring reputable investors and locking Montenegro into unfavourable deals (Vujović, 2023).

Environmental sustainability concerns have also been raised. According to watchdogs, the highway’s construction, and by extension the strategy around Bar, has harmed natural heritage, especially near river valleys, highlighting how such megaprojects come at ecological expenses (Petkova, 2021). Heavy-metal contamination cases have been reported as linked to port operations and cargo handling, exposing the gaps in health and environmental safety monitoring (Visnjic, 2024). Increased shipping, cruises, and port expansion similarly raise risks for water quality, seabed, and coastal erosion, consequently determining biodiversity loss in the Adriatic (Reuters, 2024). On land, the construction of new roads and rails is cutting through sensitive mountain and riverine landscapes, causing habitat fragmentation and slope instability (EBRD, 2025b).

Relying on foreign companies and loans for infrastructural development exposes Montenegro to increased foreign interference. Chinese loans can bring fast delivery of flagship projects but also political leverage and long-term repayment pressures, triggering domestic controversy and international concerns (Scepanovic, 2023). At the same time, competing external agencies, such as China, the EU and its Member States, and Russia, each push different models, with conflicting aims that can complicate coherent long-term infrastructural planning (Lamprecht & Ströhm, 2025). Ultimately, influence can take the form of favourable contracts and friendly business ties that pressure politics and enable decisions benefit strategic interests over local needs (Vujović, 2023).

Conclusion

If properly developed, with modern post facilities, railways, roads, and transparent management, Bar could become a major logistics hub for the Western Balkans, the Adriatic, and Europe. That opens the door to more trade, energy transit, and regional integration (Lazarevic, 2025d).

As critics call the highway project “the highway to nowhere”, since only a fraction is built while the full corridor connecting Bar to Serbia and deeper into Europe remains incomplete, the future of the Port of Bar will be determined by its governance. Bar has the potential of evolving into a sustainable logistics hub that strengthens regional connectivity while supporting EU enlargement and anchoring Montenegro within the European economic space. However, to make this scenario possible, infrastructure development needs to be embedded in transparent procurement, environmental safeguards, and EU-aligned regulatory frameworks.

On the flip side, a continued dependency on external financing, especially from China, environmental costs, and political and economic pressures could compromise national sovereignty or long-term sustainability. As some analysts warn, Montenegro risks falling into an asymmetrical dependency if infrastructure comes with strings attached (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). These consequences would not be limited to Montenegro but extend beyond its borders, affecting Adriatic environmental security, EU supply-chain resilience, and the balance of influence in the rest of the Western Balkans.

The Port of Bar and the connecting highways are not merely infrastructure projects, but a test case of Montenegro’s capacity to manage strategic assets, of the EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor in the region, and of the tension between a connectivity shaped by long-term sustainability or short-term benefit.

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