Religious Radicalisation and Foreign Fighters in the Western Balkans

Introduction

According to the definition provided by international organisations and multiple countries, radicalisation is the process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of behaviours based on ideology and beliefs, often assuming violent patterns (UNODC, 2025). The issue of religious radicalisation has been linked to some Western Balkan countries, especially due to the presence of citizens from the region within terrorist organisations such as ISIS as foreign fighters, meaning individuals who join insurgent organisations abroad, moved by ideological reasons (Bąkowski & Puccio, 2016). While the presence of Balkan citizens in the ranks and militias of extremist religious terrorist organisations has been proven, the gap between perception and current reality of religious radicalisation in the Western Balkans is wide.

By analysing the issue of foreign fighters with Balkan origins, this article will try to understand how serious the threat of religious radicalisation and extremism in the region is today. Starting from the historical background and influence factors for religious radicalisation and the rise of foreign fighters, the article will move on to understanding the responses of the countries of the region to foreign fighters and their return.

Historical and Social Background

Driven by a mix of historical, socio-economic, and political factors, religion has become an increasingly salient marker of identity for the Western Balkan communities since the 1990s, following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the consequent social fragmentation. The Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox communities, which were previously coexisting, quickly segregated, often forcefully, during and immediately after the violent conflicts.

To this day, national and ethnic communities are associated with religion: the Catholic Croats, the Muslim Bosniaks and Albanians, and the Orthodox Serbs and Macedonians (Gemi & Babameto, 2023). This identification is also reflected in politics at the national and local levels, with ethnic parties that claim to represent one or the other ethnicity and religious community.

One of the explanations for the presence of extremist Muslim communities in the region dates back to the 1990s. During the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is estimated that about 4000 mujahedin from Arab countries took part in the Bosniak militias, many of whom stayed in the country once the Dayton Agreement was signed and the war came to an end. Therefore, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Salafi jihadism gained a foothold in the region, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, where Salafi communities are today closely monitored (Mende, 2024).

Nevertheless, radicalisation cannot merely be explained through historical events. Multiple studies show that as societies segregate and isolate along ethnic and religious lines, religious misinterpretation becomes easier, possibly leading to radicalisation and extremist views (EUISS, 2024). Indeed, the fragile ecosystem that followed the conflicts, characterised by high unemployment rates, youth marginalisation, extensive emigration, and an increasing rural-urban economic gap, further exacerbated the desire to fill an ideological vacuum. Such societal fragmentation can lead to radicalisation at the local level, with communities looking for answers and reassurances for a more promising future. As a result, the average Balkan fighter in jihadist militias has been identified as a young man, between 20 and 35 years old, coming from remote rural areas and a poor economic background (Beslin & Ignjatijevic, 2017).

Forms of Radicalisation in the Region & The Rise of Foreign Fighters

Radicalisation and the recruitment process in the region happen both online and in person at the local level. Extremist organisations are especially active through online propaganda, for example, on social media, encrypted messaging apps, and transnational online networks, also translating their content into local languages, therefore managing to reach individuals all around the world (Europol, 2023).

Salafist and Wahhabi networks have been particularly present in the region since the 1990s, financed by foreign funding, and run in parallel religious structures. The presence of local networks, radical preachers, and peer influence manages to address possible recruits in person, radicalising their religious ideas and potentially convincing them to join violent organisations. Similarly, prisons and informal spaces have also been addressed as hot spots for possible radicalisation in detention and in unregulated mosques and study groups.

The outbreak of the Syrian war and the rise of violent organisations with an extremist Muslim agenda, such as ISIS and Al-Nusra, attracted foreign fighters from all around the world to support the cause of an Islamic Caliphate. It is at this point that the Western Balkan countries saw a worrying number of their citizens joining jihadist organisations abroad. It is estimated that between 2013 and 2019, a total of 1070 individuals travelled to Iraq and Syria during the years of ISIS insurgency, among whom the majority were male adults (Shtuni, 2020).

While all six Western Balkan countries reported citizens serving as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, the most common countries of origin were Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which registered among the highest rates in Europe relative to their populations. The ethnic Albanian fighters even operated a mono-ethnic combatant unit called Xhemati Alban within al-Qa`ida’s affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, also rebranded as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), in Northwest Syria (Hummel, 2019).

Foreign Influence and Funding

Radicalised networks at the local level are often funded by foreign actors disguised as humanitarian NGOs and benevolent investors (Trifunovic, n.d.).

The Gulf States and linked NGOs claiming to bring humanitarian aid, mosque construction, and religious education have often been uncovered as creators and fomenters of radicalised hubs in the region. Since the 1990s, Saudi Arabia has invested hundreds of millions of euros in building mosques, madrassas (Muslim schools), and financing Islamic NGOs in the Western Balkans, especially promoting a more conservative interpretation of Islam (Lilyanova, 2017). While the Saudi kingdom cut its financial support to Muslim communities abroad in the last few years, its previous subsidies vastly funded such groups and their activities (Mende, 2024). Other Gulf States, such as Qatar and Kuwait, have also increased their financial presence and support for Muslim communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, justifying their contributions with religious and humanitarian projects (Cognée, 2023).

Similarly, Türkiye uses religious diplomacy to project its soft power through religious institutions, especially in countries with more consistent Muslim presence, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. Through organisations such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Türkiye is a leading investor in rebuilding Ottoman-era mosques and funding infrastructure projects to restore its regional influence. An example is the impressively large, recently inaugurated Namazgah mosque in the centre of Tirana, Albania, funded by the Turkish religious authority Diyanet with €30 million (Mende, 2025).

However, it is important to differentiate the financial and cultural support of Muslim communities from the intent to radicalise, finance and train possible members of violent organisations. Muslim communities in the Western Balkans largely represent minority groups, sometimes marginalised. The support received from Muslim-majority countries can be linked to a cultural closeness that aims at providing religious infrastructure that otherwise would hardly receive financing and attention from local authorities.

State Responses from the Region

The phenomenon of foreign fighters and their return home has sparked the need for countries in the region to implement legislation prohibiting participation in foreign wars, strengthen regional and international cooperation, prosecute returnees, and implement policies for deradicalisation and reintegration.

Coinciding with a rise in nationals travelling to Iraq and Syria to join jihadist militias, all the WB6 amended criminal codes to align with UN Security Council Resolution 2178, and rapidly criminalised foreign fighting between 2014 and 2015. Such policies introduced the punishment for participation, recruitment, and travel, resulting in penalties between 6 months and 15 years of detention (Glušac, 2020). Nevertheless, despite the strict laws, proving specific intent to commit terrorism-related acts proved to be more complex than expected. As a consequence, the repatriation of returnees from conflict zones, whether voluntary or aided by international support, led to more soft convictions, with many short or even suspended sentences.

Together with the single national legislative initiatives, regional and international cooperation was also strengthened to prevent extremism and enhance counter terrorism. As some EU member states, such as France and Belgium, were facing similar issues, with citizens joining extremist organisations, the cooperation between the WB6 and the EU aimed at ensuring a safer future for both sides and a smoother EU enlargement process (European Commission, n.d.). Under such motives, the cooperation focused on intelligence sharing, border management, and deradicalisation projects, targeting both the flow of foreign fighters and local radicalisation movements. Among the key frameworks were the Joint Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism, the RAN in the Western Balkans projects, and numerous capacity-building projects enhancing the institutional and operational capacities of law enforcement agencies.

While foreign fighting was being criminalised, ISIS and other jihadist organisations were losing territory, causing an increasing disappointment in the project of the Islamic Caliphate among their supporter (Beslin & Ignjatijevic, 2017)s. However, even though the number of fighters from the region started to naturally drop, the attention to a possible revitalised radicalised network should not follow the same trend.

Coming Back Home: Deradicalisation and Prevention Policies

Alongside criminalisation, the presence of radicalised members and foreign fighter returnees in the religious communities of the WB6 posed an urgent need for deradicalisation and prevention policies. Through community-based approaches, education and youth programs, and rehabilitation and reintegration processes, national leaders and local civil society organisations aimed at preventing religious radicalisation and supporting the reintegration of returnees in their communities.

Key strategies to manage the return to society of foreign fighters included prison-exit programs, multi-agency cooperation among policymakers, social services, and NGOs, and countering extremist ideologies through projects often supported by the EU, the Council of Europe, and other international organisations (European Commission, 2024).

Prison-based rehabilitation programs for convicted returnees in penitentiary systems focused on deradicalisation and disengagement during the conviction period. These were often followed by assistance for reintegration in society, also for women and children, through social, educational, and mental health support (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Some NGO projects, although limited, focused on preventing further radicalisation at the local level by addressing root causes, building community resilience, and creating counter-narratives to violent extremism (KCSS, 2021).

However, systemic programs meant for de-radicalisation and reintegration often lacked consistent funding, leaving the development and implementation of such projects in the hands of NGOs, civil society, and international organisations operating in the Western Balkan countries. The weak involvement of national governments easily left space for political instrumentalisation of the issue of religious radicalisation, employed by one or the other ethnic party, as well as a general lack of regional coordination and data collection, which affects any possible research on radicalised communities and foreign fighters in the region.

What about today?

The complex issue of religious radicalisation and foreign fighters joining jihadist groups abroad posed a serious question about the network of such organisations in the Western Balkans during the years of ISIS expansion.

Since the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the flow of foreign fighters from the Western Balkans has almost completely stopped. Regional and international security assessments indicate that organised recruitment networks have largely been dismantled, and no significant new mobilisations have emerged in recent years (Neumann et al., 2017).

Today, radicalisation in the region is mainly characterised by isolated individuals, small informal networks, and online-based influence rather than structured organisations (Europol, 2025). Extremist propaganda continues to circulate through encrypted messaging platforms and social media, often originating from external actors, turning monitoring and prevention tasks into more complex missions.

At the same time, the return of foreign fighters still poses long-term risks. Several hundred returnees and their family members have been repatriated and reintegrated into their home societies. While most have not re-engaged in extremist activities, security agencies continue to monitor potential risks related to disengagement failures, social marginalisation, and possible secondary radicalisation.

Recent studies stress that the overall threat level in the Western Balkans remains limited compared to other European regions. The persistence of stereotypes portraying the Balkans as a “breeding ground for terrorism” is therefore misleading and contributes to the stigmatisation of Muslim communities, which overwhelmingly reject violent extremism and adhere to moderate religious practices (Karčić & Kostić, 2020).

Overall, it is clear that long-term stability depends less on repression than on sustained investment in education, social inclusion, institutional trust, and community-based prevention mechanisms.

Conclusion

The problem of religious radicalisation and the phenomenon of foreign fighters coming from the WB6 emerged within a specific historical, political, and socio-economic context marked by post-conflict fragmentation, institutional weakness, external ideological influences, and social marginalisation. Rather than reflecting a systemic tendency toward extremist interpretations of religion, the surge in mobilisation during the rise of ISIS represented a time-bound and context-dependent security challenge.

While the region experienced disproportionately high participation rates during the peak years of the Syrian conflict, current trends indicate a substantial decline in recruitment and a gradual normalisation of security conditions. Nevertheless, residual risks linked to online radicalisation, social exclusion, and incomplete reintegration processes persist, highlighting the need for continuous efforts in preventing radicalisation and fostering social cohesion.  

Effective prevention requires a balanced approach combining law enforcement, social policy, education, and community engagement. Safeguarding freedom of religion while addressing extremist distortions of faith remains essential for maintaining social cohesion and inclusion. In a nutshell, sustained investment in youth opportunities, institutional credibility, and regional cooperation will be decisive in preventing future waves of radicalisation and ensuring long-term stability in the Western Balkans and beyond.

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