The Vetting & SPAK in Albania: a bad apples clean-up or a permanent uprooting of corruption?
Introduction
After 45 years of Communist regime, in the 1990s, Albania went through a quick political and economic transition towards a democratic market economy. The fast privatisation of the economy and services, in a system that still lacked a solid rule of law, led the way to state capture[1] and widespread corruption. Today, high corruption levels still pervade the Albanian public sector, compromising the functioning of procedures such as public appointments, procurements, and trials, ultimately benefiting a small political and economic elite rather than consolidating a fair democracy. With the country’s willingness to become a Member State of the European Union, Albania has been required to reach specific rule of law and democratic standards, particularly through radical action against corruption.
For this reason, since 2016, Albania has been engaged in one of the most intensive judicial cleanup exercises: a formal “vetting” of judges and prosecutors intended to remove magistrates compromised by corruption and ties with organised crime. Supported by the EU and the US, and embedded in a wider package of justice reforms, the vetting has reshaped Albania’s judiciary and spawned a parallel anti-corruption prosecutorial effort centred on SPAK, the Special Structure Against Corruption and Crime, as the specialised prosecutorial body.
While these structures and reforms are widely presented by international actors as essential to rule of law consolidation and the country’s EU accession path, they have also raised worries about capacity, politicisation, and sustainability.
This article will delve into Albania’s problem of widespread corruption, the introduction of SPAK and the vetting process, and their achievements, consequences and criticisms, trying to understand whether these instruments can be considered as drivers for a radical long-term institutional change or just a momentary “clean-up” of the bad apples.
A Parasite called Corruption
As a legacy of fragile institutions from the Communist regime, political and economic instability, low public official salaries (around €1000 on average for PA employees, according to a 2024 Telegrafi article), and weak rule of law, during the first decades of the 21st century, Albania’s public sector registered among the highest rates of corruption in the South-Eastern European region (Transparency International, 2023). According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator: Control of corruption[2], during the past two decades, Albania registered among the worst corruption levels in the world, placing the country in the lower global percentiles for control of corruption.
(World Bank, 2024)
While posing a threat also at the European and international level due to its entanglement with organized crime, at the national level, corruption has been a persistent and systemic challenge for Albania across the public sector, such as public administration, procurement, policing and the justice system, hindering their fair functioning by failing to guarantee equal treatment to all citizens. The continuous failures in institutional checks, public procurement transparency, and impunity for high-level actors create a vicious cycle that is difficult to stop, as corrupt political and economic leaders have little interest in promoting fairer and more transparent procedures, let alone efficient anti-corruption policies.
The high level of corruption is not only an internal problem, but also one of the main issues preventing Albania’s EU integration. Indeed, the willingness to become an EU Member State is the strongest political motive for limiting corruption in the public sector. The Albanian citizens strongly support the country’s EU accession, therefore endorsing political leaders who clearly take a stance against corruption.
The structural problems provided both the political rationale and public demand for deep, institutional reform, including the vetting of magistrates and the creation of specialised investigative bodies.
SPAK & Vetting: Achievements, consequences and criticisms
Albania’s fight against corruption led to the establishment of two independent mechanisms: the Vetting of the judiciary and the Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure.
Established in 2016 together with constitutional amendments meant to reform the justice system, the vetting mechanism targets the judiciary sector, examining the assets, integrity and professional competence of judges and prosecutors (Šemić, 2022). The mechanism was led by an Independent Qualification Commission and the Appeal Commission, monitored by the International Monitoring Operation, and overseen by institutions with international involvement, aiming to guarantee the integrity of the justice system, a sector that had suffered from an important loss of public trust (European Commission, 2024). In less than 10 years, almost all magistrates have been subject to initial procedures and twice as many as expected ended in dismissals, resignations, or early retirements.
The Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure, also known as SPAK, was formally established in 2019 as a specialised prosecutorial body to investigate high-level cases of corruption and organized crime. As part of its operations, to guarantee the impartiality of its investigations, SPAK operates internal integrity monitoring mechanisms, including oversight of its staff's communications (Gunjic, 2022). Working alongside the restructured courts and capitalising on improved judicial integrity, through the years, SPAK has conducted high-profile investigations and prosecutions against Albanian political and economic elites (SPAK, 2024).
SPAK and the Vetting process have reached remarkable results in addressing the issue of corruption in Albania’s public institutions. Nevertheless, these results also highlight the enormous challenges that the country faces ahead.
As a consequence of the investigations, the vetting process resulted in more than 200 dismissals, resignations, and forced retirements, leaving the judicial system with a frightening shortage of judges and prosecutors (Hoxhaj, 2024). Similarly, SPAK’s investigations against elite political and business actors signalled a newly, more assertive, anti-corruption architecture which is not afraid of taking action against formerly untouchable suspects, such as former President Ilir Meta (Semini, 2025). These achievements are motives for hope in a more equal justice system.
On the other side of the coin, the results of SPAK and Vetting also led to serious consequences and challenges, such as an extreme shortage of personnel in the judiciary system. The wide removal of magistrates has produced capacity gaps, meaning the shortage of personnel at specialised court levels, resulting in a struggle in managing the caseload and in longer trials. The sudden need for turnover, resulting from the dismissal of personnel, led to a forced and accelerated recruitment process, increasing the tension between the need to restore capacity and the preservation of strict integrity standards (European Commission, 2025). While the focus of SPAK on elites produced major investigations, these still need to be converted into final convictions and durable deterrence in the long term, questioning SPAK’s effectiveness in generating systemic change rather than just newspaper headlines (Gunjic, 2022).
The highlighted challenges, consequently, bring to the surface some criticisms and concerns regarding the operation of the Vetting process and SPAK’s transparency and sustainability. Some observers have lamented a perceived opacity of the Vetting process, considering its slow procedure and insufficient safeguards against errors or a possible politicised use of information to obstruct one or the other candidate or representative (Sinoruka, 2023). The accusations of political polarisation and selective justice also did not miss, especially from the parties mostly affected by investigations and prosecutions. Nevertheless, representatives of the independent bodies have more times reassured about the impartiality of the investigations and the distance from any political or economic elite (European Parliament, 2025).
One risk remains without an answer and calls for regular monitoring: the long-term sustainability after the closure of the Vetting process and the operation of SPAK. Although the Vetting process uncovered an unimaginable number of corruption cases, it is important to remember that its implementation is not an end, but a means, and the lack of sustained institutional culture change, transparent recruitment, and career incentives for honest magistrates could reproduce once again a system of early gains winning over time (Feta & Rruplli, 2025).
Conclusion
The latest European Commission Enlargement Report on Albania’s progress under the accession negotiation chapters highlighted the steps forward made in the fields of public administration and judiciary reforms, with moderate levels of preparation and alignment with EU standards. The country has adopted its Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2024-2030, signalling a long-term commitment to fighting corruption in both the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, the report also stresses that further reforms are needed in addressing shortcomings of the already-in-place structures, such as investigating undeclared assets and strengthening accountability measures (European Commission, 2025b).
Albania’s vetting process and the creation and operation of SPAK have been internationally recognised as one of the boldest attempts to confront public sector corruption in the region. The immediate and tangible results previously considered improbable, such as the dismissal of magistrates and the prosecution of political elites, have helped shift perception and practice, remaining a central point in Albania’s EU integration process.
Nevertheless, the major reforms have also inexorably generated a series of secondary effects such as capacity shortages, transparency concerns, and political polarisation, highlighting the complexity of transforming a broken and deviated justice system. Today, the core challenge is converting the momentum of the Vetting and SPAK-era investigations into durable and sustainable institutional change, with a justice system able to independently deliver impartial justice and serve its community, guaranteeing fair processes and equal service.
As Albania advances in accession negotiations, the durability of SPAK’s prosecutorial record and the post-vetting judicial architecture will be decisive in determining whether the reform marks a structural transformation or remains a transitional and momentary correction.
References
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[1] The expression “state capture” refers to a systemic corruption of the political elites which bends the political action to private interests.
[2] The Index considers 200 economies in the world, ranking each of them from 0 to 100. The percentile levels describe the percentage of economies worldwide that perform worse than the selected country. Therefore, a higher value describes a better performance since most economies in the world perform worse than the selected economy, while a lower value expresses a worse performance, as fewer economies in the world perform worse than the selected one and more perform better.
