The WB6 as a Buffer Zone: How Russia Maintains its Presence in the Region

Introduction

“So, I want the people of the Western Balkans, of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to know: You are part of our family, your future is in our Union, and our Union is not complete without you!”

This is how, during her 2022 State of the Union speech, moved by geopolitical needs and in an attempt to marginalise Russian influence at the EU borders, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sparked a new momentum in the EU enlargement process, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Indeed, Russia’s ties with the WB6 have been persistent throughout history, especially with those countries inhabited by Slavic populations. The region occupies a strategic juncture between East and West, between the European Union, NATO, and other external actors. The strategic geographical and political position of the WB6 gives a multifaceted character to Russia’s interest, exploiting a broad range of ties and strategies to exert influence in the region: Historical and cultural linkages, energy and economic leverage, political-diplomatic backing for friendly actors, and the use of soft power. While Russia does not uniformly dominate across all six countries, its presence still creates a significant variable in the region’s geopolitics, especially as the WB6 are still undergoing a transition in terms of governance, integration into Western institutions, and ethnic and political fragility.

Although it has had a slight decline since 2022, Putin remains one of the most appreciated political leaders in the region, and his country one of the strongest foreign actors in the Western Balkans. Therefore, Russian influence in the WB6 merits careful analysis in terms of its modus operandi and its differentiated impact across countries.

This article will break down Russian influence in the WB6, highlighting its historical legacy, its motivations, and its forms in each country.

A Historical Link

Russian influence in the Western Balkans is neither new nor merely reactive. Historically, the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union cultivated ties with Slavic and Orthodox populations in the Balkans, such as supporting Serbia’s independence at the end of the 19th and early 20th century (Stanicek & Caprile, 2023).

The Yugoslav era was marked by a break in the relations between the region and the Soviet Union, due to Yugoslav Marshall Josip Broz Tito’s political distancing from Stalin’s policies and the creation of the non-aligned movement, uniting countries which refused links with both the US and the Soviet Union (Žarković, n.d.).

Nevertheless, relationships between the Russian Federation and specific actors in the region went through a revival during the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. After first supporting the diplomatic efforts also promoted by the US, Yeltsin’s Russia felt left out of such Western peacebuilding plans. The 1994 NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs and the Belgrade bombing constituted a break up point, since Russia had not approved such actions (Marshall, 2022). The Kremlin’s feeling that Western politics in the region were biased against Serbia and the Serb population revived a deeply rooted tradition of Russo-Serbian friendship, founded in historic and religious ties of pan-Slavism and the Orthodox Church.

Since the 2000s, and particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has increasingly combined traditional diplomacy with a blend of economic, energy and information-influence tools in the region. While the magnitude varies, the pattern is clear: exploit unresolved conflicts and institutional weaknesses in the WB6, deepen economic or energy dependencies where possible, cultivate cultural, Orthodox, and Slavic affinities, and undermine the region’s integration into Western institutions such as the EU and NATO.

Russia’s Interests and Leverages in the Region

Russia’s interests in the Western Balkans are mostly of geopolitical and economic nature, leveraging on the region’s weak governance through investments, political and diplomatic backing, and soft power.

Geographically between Westers and Easters Europe (also in terms of institutions), Russia’s main motive to deepen its presence in the region is to keep it politically aligned with its interests and, therefore, out of Euro-Atlantic alliances. The historical ties and the Slavic population are then easy arguments to appeal to and establish Russian influence right on the EU borders, maintaining a feeling of instability and tension, and undermining Euro-Atlantic integration (Zweers et al., 2023).

The WB6’s need for energy and gas remains both a reason for economic interest and a tool for political influence. Notably in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia, Russia has been the major supplier of natural gas and holds significant energy-sector assets. Similarly, Russian firms, either state-controlled or affiliated, have made targeted investments in strategic sectors such as energy, mining, and banking, with a double goal: profit and dependency (Bechev, 2023).

Soft power is also exerted by appealing to historical, religious, and cultural ties, especially in areas populated by a Slavic majority. The involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian media such as Sputnik and RT, and alliances with nationalist movements in the region are some examples of how these ties are converted into political influence (Tafuro Ambrosetti, 2022).

Russian diplomatic weight at the international level, for example from its seat at the UN Security Council, is also a solid tool to secure support by the WB populations and governments, protecting or advancing the interests of partner countries, such as Serbia’s positions on Kosovo’s status (Jagiełło, 2021).

Exploiting the Balkan countries’ weak bargaining power, institutions and rule of law, their fragile economies widely based on shadow and informal systems, and their need for energy, gas, and investments are characteristics that facilitate the way in for Russian companies and oligarchs. Altogether, interests and modus operandi create a toolkit with the aim of preserving and deepening the Russian foothold in the Western Balkans.

Country Breakdown

Serbia

Serbia remains Russia’s strongest foothold in the region. Leveraging on historical ties, the Orthodox Church, Slavic heritage, and Russia’s non-recognition of Kosovo, Serbian public opinion widely favours Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin.

Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has increased business opportunities for Russian companies in those countries that did not align with the sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia. Many Russian enterprises opened new locations in countries such as Serbia, Türkiye, and Georgia, creating new trade routes and avoiding the malign effects of the sanctions (Haas, 2023). Serbia is heavily dependent on Russian gas and energy, and Russian companies hold several assets in the country (European Parliament, 2022).

While it is debatable whether Serbia represents a loyal partner for Russia, as it conducts military trainings with NATO and is formally an EU candidate country, Russia’s weight on its economy, politics, and public opinion still secures the country as a regional anchor.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia’s influence is more nuanced, largely mediated via the Serb-majority entity of Republika Srpska, where cultural and religious ties are solid. Through political and military support to Republika Srpska, Russian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina primarily revolve around preventing the country’s EU and NATO integration.

Under the long leadership of Republika Srpska former President Milorad Dodik, the idea of the entity’s secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina has been recurrent in the political discourse and supported by the Kremlin, which has supported the Serb population since the NATO bombings during the 1992-1995 war in the country (Karčić, 2025).

Although less uniformly than in Serbia, energy dependence also provides leverage for Russian companies to gain profit and political influence in the country.

Russia’s role in Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered to be often indirect, supporting local Serb nationalist actors who oppose a unified and stronger central Bosnian state and its Euro-Atlantic integration.

Montenegro

The small country of Montenegro also presents business opportunities for Russian stakeholders, especially in the tourist sector, as the coast of the country is a popular destination for Russian nationals’ holidays. Despite the tense relationship between Russia and Montenegro since the 2016 attempted coup d’état in the latter, in 2022, it was estimated that more than 40% of properties in Montenegro were owned by Russian nationals (Kajosevic, 2022).

Russian influence in Montenegro is also expressed in the form of economic investments, energy companies, and information channels. Some reports consider Russian Foreign Direct Inverstments stock to be about 30% of Montenegro’s GDP (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2018).

Although Russia retains soft-power operations through the Orthodox Church, Slavic cultural links, and economic ties, the Balkan country joined NATO in 2017 and is an EU frontrunner candidate country, set to become a Member State by 2028. Additionally, the Russian population living in Montenegro presents a diverse political alignment, often distancing from pro-Putin ideas (Reuters, 2024).

North Macedonia

Russian influence in North Macedonia is mostly exerted through economic investments. Until 2022, Russian gas constituted 100% of gas supplies in the country. Nevertheless, the Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a shift in supplies. In 2023, the Macedonian Government announced a cut in imports from Russia and increased them from Azerbaijan and the US, also strengthening the pipelines with Bulgaria and Greece (Bankwatch Network & Eko-svest, 2024).

Although Russia is still widely considered a friendly actor by the Macedonian public opinion, North Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation has limited the Kremlin’s influence.

Albania

Russian influence in Albania is relatively weak, relying on limited investments and energy leverage in the Adriatic country, whose public opinion registers among the highest support rates for NATO and EU membership in the region (European Parliament, 2022).

Therefore, even if indirect influence operations, such as through disinformation campaigns, cannot be ruled out, Russia’s strategy in Albania is more marginal.

Kosovo

Similar to Albania, Russia does not have substantial direct economic links in Kosovo. Instead, Serbia-Kosovo tensions are instrumentalised as a lever to amplify regional instability and gain indirect influence.

Although Russia is a popular external actor among the Serb population of Kosovo, the country’s strong political alignment with the US and orientation toward Western institutions limit Russian presence (Stanicek & Caprile, 2023).

Conclusion

Russia’s influence in the WB6 is real, multifaceted and persistent, but it is neither monolithic nor uniformly dominant. Russia’s strategy in the region relies on subtle, cost-efficient tools, such as energy dependency, cultural and religious ties, historical legacies, media campaigns, support for nationalist actors, and diplomatic backing.

The region can be analysed as divided into two main blocks. On one side, the countries where historical and cultural links, economic investments, and political affinity persist, with the greatest Russian ally being Serbia. On the other side, the countries with a stronger Western orientation, namely Albania and Kosovo, which register very limited Russian interference.

Energy dependency remains a structural vulnerability and provides Russia with a successful leverage. However, the rise of new, alternative energy routes via Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, and Greece, and the push for diversification of sources, are reducing this grip.

It is worth mentioning that the slow pace of the EU accession process, the lack of administrative transparency, and the governance weaknesses of the region’s countries create opportunities for external actors to exert influence in order to fulfil their own interests. The Russian footprint in the Western Balkans remains strategic and, although not overwhelmingly dominant, it is sufficiently embedded, especially in the broader West vs Russia influence competition.

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